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Program Evaluation as a Decision Problem **
1. Introduction
This paper reexamines the Alameda portion of the Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN) program with the aim of offering new methodological perspectives on program
evaluation. Program evaluation is carried out by comparing the values of a range of out-
comes of interest for a treatment and a control group, typically by considering the average
treatment effect and its statistical significance.1 For example, compared with the alternative
                                                
** I am grateful to Gary Chamberlain, Edward Glaeser, Caroline Minter Hoxby, Guido Imbens, and Law-
rence Katz for their support and encouragement; to an Associate Editor and three anonymous referees,
Joshua Angrist, Richard Blundell, and Jeffrey Smith for detailed suggestions; to Gordon Anderson, Vivek
Dehejia, Roberta Gatti, James Heckman, Kei Hirano, Jeffrey Liebman, Emily Mechner, Carl Morris, Dale
Poirier, Donald Rubin, and Amartya Sen for their invaluable input; and to seminar participants at Columbia
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vard University, Johns Hopkins University, Mathematica Policy Research, McGill University, the NSF-
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Evaluation of Active Labor Market Policies in Europe for comments. I owe a special debt to Sadek Wahba
for bringing the GAIN data to my attention and for many conversations during our ongoing collaboration,
and to the Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC) for facilitating and permitting the use
of these data. Responsibility for any remaining errors and omissions is my own.
1 In randomized trials such comparisons give unbiased estimates of the treatment effect (see Fisher 1935
and Neyman 1935). In a non-experimental setting the comparison would have to control for potential
sources of sample selection bias. See, inter alia, Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999), Heckman (1989,
1990, 1992), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith,
2– Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – the GAIN program has a positive
but not statistically significant average treatment effect on earnings and the probability of
employment. Usually, the average treatment effect is also considered for subsets of the
sample, defined based on pre-treatment characteristics.
The methodology that I adopt differs because it models program evaluation as a
decision problem, and allows us to go beyond the average treatment effect along three di-
mensions. First, I consider how the program being evaluated will be made available sub-
sequent to the evaluation. For example, will all individuals be required to participate in
either the treatment program or the control program? These are the two options normally
considered in evaluations. I also allow for the possibility that a counselor (caseworker in
the context of welfare programs) can decide to which program – treatment or control –
each individual will be assigned. This is a reasonable option to consider, because the
practice of profiling program participants in order to determine receipt of services has be-
come widespread (for example, in unemployment insurance, see Berger, Black, and Smith,
2001; and Runner, 1996).
Second, in choosing among the available options – which at this point include
treatment, control, and assignment by a caseworker – I pay particular attention to how un-
certainty about the outcome of interest affects the choice among programs. It is well known
that a t-statistic does not embody all of the information relevant for a rational decision-
                                                                                                                                                
and Todd (1998), Heckman and Smith (1995), Lalonde (1986), Manski (1989, 1993), and Manski and
Garfinkel (1992).
3maker.2 I therefore use predictive distributions – distributions which capture all of the un-
certainty about the outcome of interest – which then allow for the use of standard expected
utility theory in comparing the distribution of outcomes under the available programs. Fi-
nally, I allow for the policymaker to exhibit inequality aversion, which also entails looking
beyond the average treatment effect.
 Such issues have been largely ignored in the evaluation literature, with a few nota-
ble exceptions. Heckman and Smith (1998) (see also Heckman, Smith, and Clements,
1997) rigorously consider the data requirements for evaluating various social welfare
functions. Within the framework of their paper, the current paper focuses on social welfare
functions that do not require information on the joint distribution of earnings under treat-
ment and control.  Manski (1999) (also Manski, 1995) develops non-parametric bounds for
the expected welfare from different post-evaluation assignment rules, and Manski (2000)
extends the analysis to the case where the policymaker’s objective is not well defined.
Both of his papers are complementary to the current research, because they explore related
issues using non-Bayesian econometrics or non-standard decision theory. The contribution
of this paper is that it offers an approach that unifies an analysis of individual-level hetero-
geneity with an analysis of the impact of risk- and inequality-aversion at the level of the
policymaker.
                                                
2 The finance literature has made a similar point in a very different context.  See Kandel and Stambaugh
(1996).  In addressing the questions, “Are stock market returns predictable and does it matter?” they argue
that rather than formulating the question in terms of the statistical significance of the relevant parameters
in an econometric model, one should look at the impact of such predictability on the portfolio decision of
interest. See also Barberis (2000) and Chamberlain (2000).
4Using the GAIN data, I demonstrate that the methodological contributions just out-
lined are important in understanding the impact of the GAIN treatment. I show first that a
caseworker who maximizes participants’ post-assignment probability of employment will
assign less than half of the individuals into GAIN. In terms of the evaluation, this implies
that the policy of assignment by a caseworker yields higher average post-assignment earn-
ings than either of the other two policies (assigning all individuals into either GAIN or
AFDC) that are normally considered. When it is selectively available through a case-
worker, GAIN emerges as viable in a cost-benefit sense as well; this overturns the tradi-
tional evaluation of the program. More generally, whenever there is heterogeneity in the
treatment impact, allowing for assignment by a caseworker will be of central interest.
Further, I show that the evaluation of the GAIN program changes significantly when
one consistently accounts for uncertainty. In particular, the ranking that emerges between
policies -- for example, that assignment by a caseworker dominates GAIN, which in turn
dominates AFDC, in terms of post-assignment earnings -- is economically significant in the
sense that the predictive distribution of earnings under one program first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the earnings distribution under the other program. In contrast, the ranking
that emerges from a more standard t-test on the difference in means is equivocal; the differ-
ence is positive but not statistically significant.3  Finally, I show that allowing for inequal-
                                                
3 A highly relevant issue that I do not discuss here is:  to what extent can one extrapolate the result to
other populations of interest and to other time periods?  When treatment effects are estimated at the indi-
vidual level, one can, in principle, extrapolate to other populations to the extent that they have the same
support in the space of pre-treatment variables as the original sample (assuming ignorable assignment). If
the model is suitably specified, one can also extrapolate through time.  See Dehejia (2000) and Hotz, Im-
bens, and Mortimer (1999).
5ity aversion changes the ranking between GAIN and AFDC, with the latter preferred for
moderately inequality-averse preferences.
GAIN is an interesting program to study not only because it is very similar to
California’s current welfare program (CalWORKs) but also because similar welfare-to-
work programs have been initiated by many states since the 1980s (Greenberg and Wise-
man, 1992, survey 24 such programs).  At another level, GAIN is one in a long line of so-
cial experiments (see Burtless, 1995, for a recent survey) and methodological conclusions
about evaluating GAIN will be broadly relevant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the GAIN program
and experiment. Section 3 describes the econometric model that I use. Section 4 examines
the decision problems for two typical individuals. Section 5 discusses the social decision
problem and the choice of social welfare functions.  Section 6 examines the results of the
model at the social level, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The GAIN Program and the GAIN Experiment
The GAIN program began operating in California in 1986, with the aim of “increasing em-
ployment and fostering self-sufficiency” among AFDC recipients (see Riccio, et al., 1994).
In 1988, six counties -- Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare --
were chosen for an experimental evaluation of the benefits of GAIN.  In this paper we will
confine ourselves to the Alameda County portion of the data. A companion paper (Dehejia
2000) examines all six counties and the issues that arise in evaluating programs imple-
mented across multiple sites.
6A subset of AFDC recipients (single parents with children aged six or older and
unemployed heads of two-parent households) were required to participate in the GAIN ex-
periment. For its evaluation, Alameda further confined itself to long-term welfare recipi-
ents (individuals already having received welfare for two years or more).4 As a result, the
chronology of the data and subsequent results is in experimental time, rather than calendar
time. No sanctions were used if individuals failed to attend the orientation sessions.  How-
ever, once individuals started in the GAIN program, sanctions were used to ensure their
ongoing participation.
At the time of enrollment into the program, a variety of background characteristics
was recorded for both treatment and control units, including: demographic characteristics,
results of a reading and mathematics proficiency test, and data on 10 quarters of pre-
treatment earnings. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the Alameda sample: 85 per-
cent are women, who on average have more than two children; the mean level of education
is grade 10; a quarter have previously participated in training programs; the average level
of pre-treatment earnings is low, ranging from $150 to $190 per quarter; but because 87
percent of pre-treatment earnings are zero, the average of non-zero pre-treatment earnings
is higher, on the order of $1,110 per quarter.5
Of those who attended the orientation session, half were randomly assigned into the
GAIN program. These individuals continue to receive AFDC benefits, but face additional
                                                
4 This implies that the Ashenfelter (1978) “dip” in earnings cannot be observed in pre-assignment earn-
ings.
5 Seven individuals are excluded from the original sample because of apparent coding errors in their co-
variates. These seven individuals are either coded as having 70 children or a previous hourly wage of more
than $300.
7requirements and receive additional services (described below). The other half is assigned
to a control group that is prohibited from receiving GAIN services.6 Because assignment to
treatment was random, the distribution of pre-assignment covariates is balanced across the
treatment and control groups; the data legend lists each of the covariates. In terms of the
chronology of data gathering, “experimental” time (which I also refer to as post-assignment
time) begins when individuals attend the GAIN orientation session. The early stages of
post-assignment time thus coincide with the education and training part of the GAIN pro-
gram.7
There are several components to the GAIN treatment: basic education, for those
deemed to be in need of it (this includes either preparation for the General Educational
Development certificate, Adult Basic Education, or English as a Second Language); job
search; and job training, for those who do not find jobs (includes on-the-job training and
                                                
6 Of course, these individuals could participate in non-GAIN employment-creating activities. The exis-
tence of non-GAIN activities is important in interpreting the treatment effect from GAIN.  The treatment
effect measures the increase in earnings, employment, etc., from the availability of, and encouragement
(or requirement) to use, GAIN-related services compared with pre-existing employment services.  To the
extent that both groups receive AFDC benefits, the comparison is between the presence and absence of
supplementary services and requirements.
7 More precisely, individuals were registered in the first quarter of experimental time.  This means that in
some cases the first quarter of experimental time in fact includes information from one or two months
prior to the commencement of the experiment.  For example, for an individual who attended an orienta-
tion session in February 1989, the first quarter of experimental time is from January to March 1989.  Of
course, some part of the first and second quarters could be spent participating in treatment activities.
Pre-assignment data would cover the 10 quarters from July 1986 to December 1988.
8paid or unpaid work experience). Participants were exempted from the requirement to par-
ticipate in GAIN activities if they found work on their own. 8
The outcome that we consider is earnings, which is observed for 13 quarters fol-
lowing assignment to treatment. From Tables 2 and 3, we see that GAIN’s impact on both
earnings and the probability of employment is negative in the first quarter; this is not sur-
prising, since treatment units are participating in training activities in the first quarter.  The
treatment effect subsequently increases, ranging from 2 to 4 percent for the probability of
employment and $200 for earnings (both are statistically significant).9
Finally, we should note that the assumption of a constant treatment effect across all
individuals is very restrictive. The average treatment effect potentially embodies an array
of heterogeneous treatment effects. Two examples illustrate this point. Figure 1 depicts the
interaction between the treatment effect and the score on the reading test: individuals who
score 200 or more enjoy a higher treatment effect, although the standard error is quite
large.  In Figure 2, we see that individuals who have previously participated in training
                                                
8 Only about 85 percent of the treated units actively participated in any GAIN activities; the balance satis-
fied the requirements of the GAIN program on their own (in most cases by finding employment within the
first two or three quarters of experimental time). Thus, as observed earlier, this is important in interpret-
ing the treatment effect as the impact of the GAIN program as a whole rather than the components of the
treatment, because some portion of the impact is through participants who find work in order to avoid the
burden of participating in treatment activities. See Black, Berger, Smith, and Noel (1999).
9 An earlier version of this paper (Dehejia 1997) examines the impact of lagged employment status on the
treatment impact, and shows that the treatment increases the probability of transition from non-
employment to employment. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Ashenfelter and Card (1985)
and Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde (1997).
9programs also enjoy a higher treatment effect. Although these interactions are not statisti-
cally significant, we will see that they have a substantial impact on the decision problem.10
3. A Model of the Earnings Data
3.1 The Statistical Model
LetYi
t
j  denote earnings, where j=1 (GAIN) or 0 (AFDC), i=1,…,1360, and t=1,…,13. Yi
t
1
is interpreted as individual i’s earnings in period t if she was in GAIN, and Yi
t
0  as her
earnings if she was in AFDC; obviously one of these is counter-factual. Thus, observed
earnings are defined as:
Y T Y T Yit i i
t
i i
t= + -1 01( ) , (1)
where Ti is a treatment indicator (=1 if individual i was in fact assigned to GAIN, and =0 if
she was assigned to AFDC). Realizations of the random variable are denoted in lower
case, yit.
A key feature of the distribution of earnings, which influences the model choice and
was highlighted in Section 2, is the mass point in the distribution of earnings at zero. The
strategy adopted is to use a censored normal likelihood, the Tobit model.  Following Chib

















                                                
10 It is well known that statistical significance is not the criterion that a rational decisionmaker considers
in choosing between alternatives. For example, in the finance literature, Barberis (2000) notes that the
predictability of stock market returns is not statistically significant, yet it is sufficient to influence an
agent’s portfolio choice (relative to bonds) over a sufficiently long horizon.
10
For the Tobit model
{ } ),(~,,131* sbsb ittititit xNxXY == , (3)
The vector of explanatory variables is given by xit=(11 it,L,113 it, [11 itL113 it]·Ti, Zi, Zi×Ti,
Rit). [11 itL113 it] is a set of indicator variables for each quarter of post-assignment time
(1k it=1 if t=k, =0 otherwise), giving each period its own intercept.  The treatment indicator
is interacted with [11 itL113 it]. Since each period corresponds to experimental, rather than
calendar, time, the treatment dummies produce a profile of the treatment effect over 13
quarters. Exogenous regressors, Zi and their interactions with the treatment indicator are
also included, which allow the treatment effect to vary with observable pre-treatment char-
acteristics. These characteristics include: indicators for the age and number of children,
race and ethnicity, educational attainment, score on the reading and mathematics tests, sex,
an indicator for previous participation in other training programs, and 10 periods of pre-
assignment earnings history.11 A calendar time trend, Rit, is also included.12
                                                
11 Pre-assignment earnings are treated as predetermined, not auto-regressive, variables.
12 Note that the earnings process is i.i.d., conditional on covariates. This specification allows for persis-
tent differences in earnings across individuals through the permanent, rather than transitory, component.
The source of heterogeneity is individual exogenous characteristics, which are also interacted with the
treatment indicator. Note also that the model is not interpreted structurally; it is used predictively. It
would be an interesting extension to consider more general specifications for earnings processes (see for
example Hirano 2000), which might improve predictions to some extent, but for the questions which I
examine the current model produces predictions that are robust to generalizations of the model (e.g., to a
mixture of normals or to allow for additional serial correlation in earnings).
11
I use diffuse priors for the parameters of the model. The Appendix discusses the
estimation procedure in detail.
3.2 The Predictive Distribution
Because the decision problems associated with program evaluation are in the space of out-
comes, not the space of the parameters of the model, it is important to construct a distribu-
tion in the outcome space which embodies all of the uncertainty from the model (i.e., con-
ditional on parameters) and from parameter estimation. This is called the (posterior) pre-
dictive distribution.
Imagine predicting earnings for an (I+1)st individual. This individual is identified
by ZI+1, a set of exogenous variables. By specifying the time dummies and the treatment in-
dicator we construct xI+1 t. Conditional on parameters, (b(i),s(i)), we can simulate the out-
come distribution by drawing for YI+1,t (from the likelihood (3), N(b(i)xit,s(i))). To obtain the
predictive distribution, we must account for parameter uncertainty; thus, we use draws
from the posterior distribution of the parameters (obtained from the Gibbs sampler outlined
in the appendix): b(i),s(i)~ p(b,s|Data). For each draw, we simulate the outcome distribu-
tion from the likelihood. Using this procedure, we obtain the joint predictive distribution of
earnings for individual I+1 from periods 1,...,13. To vary the treatment status, we re-
specify xit by switching the treatment indicator.
3.3 The Choice and Fit of the Model
A major issue is the choice of likelihood. The predictive distribution only captures uncer-
tainty correctly if the model is specified correctly. Figures 3 and 4 give a sense of the fit of
12
the model. These figures show the density of the empirical distribution of average earnings
for treated and control units (estimated through a histogram), and plot the density of the
predictive distribution of average earnings.
As we can see from the figures, the empirical distributions of earnings for treated
and control units are well approximated by the truncated normal density. The model also
fits the mass point with reasonable accuracy: an empirical probability of employment of
0.2047 for treated units compared to a predictive probability of 0.2040, and 0.1852 versus
0.1756 for control units.13
4. The Individual-Level Impact
This section studies the individual-level impact of the GAIN treatment. It not only provides
a detailed view of the impact of the program, but also lays the foundations for the analysis
in Section 6 of the social welfare problem.
Imagine that a caseworker has to choose whether to assign an individual into GAIN
or AFDC. For the caseworker, an individual is identified by her pre-assignment charac-
teristics. Thus, the key assumption is that the individual under consideration is exchange-
able with those in the data; that is, earnings for individuals with the same covariates are
taken to be drawn from the same distribution. A rather strong implication of this assump-
                                                
13 A non-parametric model is another option. I use a parametric model because it allows me to incorpo-
rate many explanatory variables, which is important in this application and is difficult in a non-parametric
setting. An alternative would be to use a flexibly parametric model. The results would be similar to those
presented here (see for example, Dehejia 1999b).
13
tion is that the caseworker does not have (or use) any private information – i.e., informa-
tion that is not observed by the researcher – in the assignment decision.14
4.1 Two Typical Examples
Table 4 shows the pre-treatment covariates of two individuals from the Alameda County
sample for whom we see typical patterns in the distributions of earnings under treatment
and control. Ms. Ten Forty-Three is a clear winner from GAIN, and Ms. Eight Twenty-
Two is a clear loser. Ms. Ten Forty-Three is age 23, heads a single-parent household, has
one child between the age of 6 and 11, and has completed high school. Her earnings history
shows that she was employed in each of the quarters prior to the experiment.  Ms. Eight
Twenty-Two is a 41-year-old woman, the head of a single-parent household, has one child
between the age of 12 and 18, and has completed high school. Her earnings history shows
substantially higher earnings in all but one of pre-assignment periods.  Let us consider each
individual in turn.
Table 5a shows the probability of positive earnings, and the mean and standard de-
viation of the predictive distribution of earnings, for each period under both treatment and
control for Ms. Ten Forty-Three. For each of the 13 periods, the probability of positive
earnings and the mean of earnings are higher in the GAIN treatment than in the control pro-
gram. The profile of the treatment effect is increasing, in a pattern similar to that depicted
                                                
14 The assumption of exchangeability conditional on covariates is not unique to my application. This as-
sumption, or some alternative, is needed any time we want to extrapolate from a dataset to a new situation.
If the individual herself is making the choice, but any private information she has is independent of the
observed covariates, then there would be no systematic errors in terms of average earnings for the group
of interest.
14
in Table 3 for Alameda County on average. However, the standard deviation of control
earnings is higher than that of treatment earnings, and the difference between the treatment
and control earnings is small compared with the magnitude of the standard deviation (i.e.
there is substantial overlap in the predictive distributions of earnings).15 Is the difference
between treatment and control earnings significant?
Within a decision framework, we could say that the difference is significant if a
wide range of decisionmakers would opt for the treatment distribution over the control
distribution. Figure 5 depicts the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the predic-
tive distribution for each of the 13 periods. In each of the 13 post-assignment periods,
treatment earnings first-order stochastically dominate control earnings. Any risk-neutral or
risk-averse agent (whose preferences are increasing in earnings) would prefer the treat-
ment distribution. This is a simple illustration of the fact that even when the means of the
two distributions under consideration are not very different, the underlying decision may be
clearcut.
For Ms. Eight Twenty-Two, it is a different matter. In Figure 6 we see that her dis-
tribution of earnings in the control first-order stochastically dominates her distribution of
earnings in treatment in each period.  As long as more earnings are preferred to less, the
caseworker unambiguously would not assign her to participate in GAIN. Of course, first-
order stochastic dominance does not suffice to compare all the distributions that arise. In
general, expected utility comparisons would be required.
                                                
15 The difference in means is not significant in the sense that the 95 percent probability intervals of the
posterior distributions substantially overlap. But the standard deviation of the predictive distribution is not
15
4.2 The Importance of Accounting for Uncertainty
A natural question that arises from the preceding analysis is: would similar decisions have
been reached if uncertainty had not been accounted for as comprehensively? In particular,
one might imagine using the model described in Section 3 but, rather than using the full
posterior distribution of the parameters, using point estimates and treating them as though
they were the true parameters. Of course, even without parameter uncertainty, the intrinsic
uncertainty embodied in the likelihood (3) has to be taken into account. Table 5c presents
such an exercise for Ms. Three Ninety-Seven, whose characteristics are given in Table 4.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5c present the distribution of her earnings in each of the 13 quar-
ters, ignoring parameter uncertainty, but still accounting for the uncertainty conditional on
parameters. In contrast, columns 5 to 8 summarize the posterior distribution of her earn-
ings, in which parameter uncertainty is accounted for.
The means of the two sets of predictions are broadly similar, as are the standard
deviations, but the sign of the treatment effect is reversed. When uncertainty is ignored, the
mean of predicted control earnings is higher; when we account for uncertainty, the reverse
is true. If the decisionmaker exhibits risk-aversion, then the differences between the two
programs are not as extreme. The final row of the table shows that the expected utility
(with log preferences) of each program is the same.
Of course, this example was chosen precisely because ignoring uncertainty leads to
different advice than accounting for it. In cases where the two distributions are starkly dif-
                                                                                                                                                
very informative, because of the mass point in the distribution. This is another reason to examine the en-
tire distribution of earnings, which we do below.
16
ferent, ignoring uncertainty typically would not lead to a change in the decision. For the
overall sample from Alameda, uncertainty affects decisions for about 10 percent of indi-
viduals.
4.4 The Importance of Heterogeneity
We could consider such decision problems for a wider array of individuals.  The differ-
ences in the results would reflect the underlying heterogeneity in the treatment effect.  One
view of this is presented in Table 6. Assume that each of the 1,360 individuals in the
Alameda sample will be assigned to either GAIN or AFDC and, as in the previous exam-
ples, imagine that the decision is made by a caseworker based on the predictive distribu-
tions of their earnings in each period under each program. Two criteria are considered:
maximizing the probability of post-assignment employment and assigning to treatment indi-
viduals for whom the expected increase in earnings exceeds the training costs. 16
Table 6 presents the mean of expected post-assignment earnings under GAIN and
AFDC and the mean of pre-assignment covariates. We see that depending on the criterion
either 18 or 56 percent of the sample are faring better under the treatment. The average
treatment effect is $323 (–$113) for those (not) assigned to treatment under the first crite-
rion, and $532 (–$11) for those (not) treated under the second criterion. Comparing those
assigned to treatment and control for each criterion is revealing. For both criteria, those
benefiting from GAIN generally have fewer children (except under age 4 for the second
                                                
16 The GAIN public use file does not contain information on which services individuals received if they
participated in the treatment. In the absence of this data, we assume that the cost of the GAIN program is
17
criterion), have higher scores on the reading and mathematics tests, have a higher level of
educational attainment, are younger, and often have participated previously in training pro-
grams. Of particular note is the difference in the level of pre-assignment earnings, which
are by and large higher for those benefiting from treatment (though Ms. Eight Twenty-Two
is an exception). Comparing the two criteria, we see that those who are assigned to treat-
ment by the second criterion have on average an even higher level of pre-assignment earn-
ings, and a greater proportion have previously participated in training programs (0.8 com-
pared to 0.4).
Table 6 in essence arrives at profiles of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of
GAIN. These profiles are not a substitute for individual predictions (as in Section 4.1) or
an overall evaluation (as in Section 6, below). But they do allow us to generalize to some
extent about the attributes of those who benefit from the treatment. These profiles are of
great relevance in the contemporary policy environment, because welfare agencies in fact
are now profiling program participants to determine who should receive supplemental
services (see inter alia Berger, Black, and Smith 2001). The method described in this sec-
tion achieves this profiling in a systematic manner.
5. The Social Choice Problem
Thus far the analysis has focused on the individual-level decision between GAIN and
AFDC.  This section takes the next step by asking: how can the policymaker decide which
                                                                                                                                                
the same across participants, which is estimated at $3,638 for 13 quarters (Riccio, et al. 1996). Hotz,
Imbens, and Klerman (2000) obtain data on which treatment participants received.
18
program or combination of programs to make available, given the pattern of individual ef-
fects?  There are two steps in this decision.
First is choosing the set of policies under consideration in the post-evaluation envi-
ronment, where policies determine each individual’s assignment to treatment. I consider
the following alternatives: (1) All individuals are required to participate in GAIN; (2) All
individuals remain in AFDC; (3) A caseworker assigns each individual into the program in
which she is most likely to “succeed”. Success is defined by a range of criteria that include
the probability of finding employment, expected earnings, the increase in earnings net of
program costs, and the expected utility of earnings. I consider two expected utility func-
tions: log and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with the coefficient of relative risk
aversion equal to 3.17 Note that these are the preferences that the caseworker uses to assess
individual earnings.
The second choice is the set of criteria (that is, social welfare functions or SWFs)
that the policymaker uses to decide which policy to adopt. I consider two sets of alterna-
tives. The first set ignores issues of inequality and focuses on outcomes averaged over the
13 post-assignment periods that are under consideration. These outcomes include average
earnings, the probability of employment, and the increase in earnings net of program
costs.18 In the absence of uncertainty, each SWF would produce a single number (for exam-
ple, average earnings) for each program. Because there is uncertainty, we integrate out the
unknown parameters and the intrinsic uncertainty, producing a predictive distribution of
                                                
17 The literature has suggested a range of values between 0 and 5. Friend and Blume (1975) obtain indirect
evidence from individual asset holdings. They estimate a value between 2 and 3.
19
each SWF for each program. In practice, this amounts to drawing for the outcome from
each individual’s predictive distribution of earnings, computing the SWFs, and repeating
this procedure until the distribution is well approximated.
The second set of SWFs allows for inequality-aversion. Four standard SWFs are
considered: utilitarian (the inequality-neutral benchmark); and exponential with coefficient
of inequality aversion ranging from one (log preferences, slightly inequality averse), to
three (intermediate), to infinity (Rawlsian) (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). For these
SWFs, we account for uncertainty by first collapsing each individual’s predictive distribu-
tion of earnings in each program to its certainty equivalent, and then applying the SWFs to
the certainty equivalents.19
6. Accounting for Risk and Inequality Aversion
A useful benchmark for the social evaluation of GAIN is the conclusion reached using dif-
ferences in means rather than predictive distributions; I consider this below. Table 7 pres-
ents the three social welfare criteria discussed in Section 5. For post-assignment earnings
and the probability of employment, there is a positive but insignificant treatment impact.
For earnings net-of-costs, the impact is significant.
Tables 8 to 10 apply the social welfare analysis outlined in Section 5 to the pre-
dictive, rather than the empirical, distributions of outcomes under treatment and control,
allowing for a range of post-evaluation assignment mechanisms. I simulate the predictive
                                                                                                                                                
18 These criteria ignore the disutility that might be experienced by program participants from reduced
leisure or a change in job attributes. See Dehejia (1999a) and Greenberg (1997).
19 A zero discount rate is assumed, but the results are not sensitive to this choice.
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distribution of earnings under treatment and control for 13 quarters of post-assignment
earnings for each of the 1,360 individuals in the sample.
Table 8 displays the first set of social welfare criteria discussed in Section 5. Con-
sider first average post-assignment earnings per person per quarter.  From the first two
cells of column 1, the mean predictions from the model ($428 for GAIN and $340 for
AFDC) are similar to those obtained from the empirical distribution, within $35 for both
GAIN and AFDC. The 95 percent posterior confidence intervals do not overlap. Cells 3 to
6 show that the policies of assigning individuals based on their probability of post-
assignment employment, or based on expected (or the expected utility of) earnings, yield
substantially higher average quarterly earnings than the policy of enrolling everyone in
GAIN ($478 compared with $428).20 This is not surprising in light of Table 6, which re-
veals substantial heterogeneity underlying the average treatment effect. Even though the
heterogeneity may not be statistically significant, it is economically significant in the sense
that a decisionmaker (with preferences ranging from risk-neutral to moderately risk-
averse) would opt not to assign a significant fraction of the sample to the treatment.
From column 1 of Table 8 it is not possible to determine to what extent the policy-
maker’s risk attitude would affect the ranking of the programs. The fact that the predictive
distributions of the GAIN and AFDC options do not overlap suggests that the difference is
significant, but the policies with individual assignment do overlap with the policy of as-
signing all individuals to GAIN. The advantage of working with the predictive distribution
                                                
20 The findings are sharper than would be obtained from an extreme bounds analysis (see Manski 1995,
1999, 2000). Of course, the sharper findings come at a price: the willingness to specify a likelihood
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of the social welfare values is seen in Figure 7, which plots the CDFs of the predictive
distributions for the first four assignment rules. We note that GAIN first-order stochasti-
cally dominates AFDC, and in turn is dominated by individual assignment policies. The
ranking between the two individual assignment policies is unclear, since they produce an
almost identical assignment.
The second social welfare function ranks the policy alternatives by post-assignment
probability of employment. GAIN (in keeping with its stated mandate) does succeed in in-
creasing the probability of employment relative to AFDC, although the magnitude of the
difference is not large (0.21, compared with 0.18). The policy of individual assignment
based on probability of employment, by definition, maximizes the post-assignment prob-
ability of employment (0.22 compared with 0.20 for GAIN). Again, the outcome is very
similar when individuals are assigned based on expected post-evaluation earnings.
The third column reveals that the increased earnings realized by assigning all indi-
viduals into GAIN do not offset the increased costs when compared with AFDC (a net
difference of –$192 per person per quarter), nor are the costs of treatment offset by in-
creased earnings when individuals are assigned by a caseworker based on the probability
of employment or expected earnings. For assignment based on risk-averse (CRRA(3))
preferences, the program appears to break even. The final row in Table 8 highlights this
point by considering assigning only those individuals to treatment for whom the expected
increase in earnings offsets the increased costs. This maximizes the third social welfare
                                                                                                                                                
model. But having paid the price the advantage is a full posterior distribution for the outcomes of interest,
allowing for a richer analysis of individual decisions.
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criterion, which achieves a value of $46. Figure 8 illustrates that these policies, again, can
be ranked by stochastic dominance.
Thus, combining the three columns of Table 8 suggests that policies which allow
individualized assignment dominate the policy in which all individuals are assigned to
GAIN: the former policies are cheaper and result in higher average earnings per person.
These policies also dominate AFDC in terms of average earnings. The only policy that
dominates AFDC in terms of increased earnings net-of-cost is explicitly assigning to treat-
ment only those individuals for whom increased earnings exceed training costs. We con-
clude that allowing a caseworker to assign individuals into GAIN and AFDC makes both
individuals and the social planner better off; thus, we reach a positive assessment of the
treatment. In contrast, ignoring the possibility of individual assignment, one would con-
clude that GAIN has a mixed and limited impact on individual earnings, with its benefits
more than offset by the increased costs of the program.
Another set of concerns for the policymaker is the distribution of the benefits from
GAIN. Presumably not all forms of inequality are of concern to the policymaker. Indeed, an
increase in the upper percentiles of the earnings distribution of GAIN relative to AFDC
would be one of the aims of training. However, if GAIN were to reduce earnings in the
lower percentiles, then this might be a source of concern. Table 9 presents percentiles of
the predictive distributions of earnings in each program (averaged over the 13 quarters and
1360 individuals). The 5th percentile for each of the policies is zero.  From the 25th to the
50th percentiles AFDC overtakes GAIN, and from the 50th to the 90th percentiles GAIN
overtakes AFDC. This is depicted in Figure 9, which shows the differences in the percen-
tiles of earnings between GAIN and AFDC. The figure reveals that AFDC once again
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overtakes GAIN for very high percentiles of earnings. (This fits into the pattern of Ms.
Eight Twenty-Two in Table 5b, who had very high pre-assignment earnings, but fared
poorly in the treatment.) For individual assignment to treatment, each of the percentiles ex-
ceeds the corresponding percentile for GAIN or AFDC. The final column in Table 9 pres-
ents a more synoptic view of inequality by examining the 90-10 difference for each pro-
gram. The 90-10 spread increases from $361 for ADFC, to $453 for GAIN, to $494 for the
individual assignment policies.21
In Table 10, we explicitly examine the role of the policymaker’s attitude toward ex
ante inequality by applying a range of SWFs to the predictive distribution of post-
assignment earnings. The table reveals that for a sufficient degree of inequality aversion
(either exponential or Rawlsian) the ranking between GAIN and AFDC is reversed, with
AFDC preferred. However, even for extreme inequality-aversion, the policy of individual
assignment is preferred to either GAIN or AFDC. The lower two panels of the table dem-
onstrate that this conclusion does not depend on the individual preferences used to compute
the certainty equivalents.  As noted in Section 5, the social welfare rankings do not require
standard errors or confidence intervals; uncertainty is already accounted for, since the ta-
ble is based on certainty equivalents of the earnings distribution.
The overall picture that emerges from Tables 8 to 10 is that GAIN is strongly pre-
ferred to AFDC in terms of earnings and the probability of employment, but not in terms of
earnings net-of-costs or in the presence of a sufficient degree of inequality aversion. The
                                                
21 Because the joint distribution of earnings is not identified, we cannot make claims about how particular
individuals fare relative to the distribution in each program. See Heckman and Smith (1998) and Heck-
man, Smith, and Clements (1997) for an approach to doing this.
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policy of individualized assignment emerges as superior to both GAIN and AFDC in terms
of all the criteria considered. Depending on the assignment rule, this policy also can lead
to a net gain in terms of increased earnings net-of-increased-costs.
9. Conclusion
This paper examines the implications of shifting the emphasis in program evaluation from
examining average treatment effects and their statistical significance to looking at the un-
derlying decision problem.  There are several important differences that emerge.
First, by considering the decision problem at the individual level (solved by the
caseworker), we can expose the heterogeneity in the treatment impact, and produce a pro-
file of the winners and losers from GAIN. Second, by embedding individual assignment
within the policymaker’s decision problem, we allow the policymaker to consider not only
the usual policies of assigning all individuals to GAIN or AFDC, but also policies that as-
sign individuals based on a range of criteria such as maximizing earnings or the probability
of employment. Third, by considering the full predictive distribution of the evaluation cri-
teria (such as average earnings or increased earnings net-of-costs) we are able systemati-
cally to account for uncertainty in the policymaker’s decision. The question of whether the
difference between two programs is significant now reduces to asking what decision a
policymaker would take. When the decision is invariant to the policymaker’s preferences
(as was the case in the GAIN example), an economically “significant” ranking emerges.
Finally, by converting uncertainty regarding individual earnings into certainty equivalents,
we are able to examine the importance of inequality aversion in ranking programs.
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These results are certainly important for an analysis of the GAIN data, but they are
also relevant to other exercises in program evaluation. For any program in which there is
heterogeneity in the treatment impact, there is potentially a role for individualized assign-
ment into treatment. This is especially true for programs in which the gains from the treat-
ment do not exceed the costs for some individuals. Also, the importance of comparing out-
comes under different programs using their predictive distributions rather than simply the
first moments of their empirical distributions applies quite broadly to other evaluations.
The relevance of this framework extends beyond the case of randomized experiments con-
sidered here. In non-experimental settings, a similar methodology could be adopted, if an
appropriate selection correction mechanism were adopted.
The model can be extended in a number of directions. First, in some policy con-
texts, there may exist substantial prior information regarding the control program. Such in-
formation could readily be incorporated into the priors of the model. Second, there is
scope to add greater heterogeneity, perhaps by using a hierarchical model to incorporate
many more interactions. Third, the model could be modified to forecast beyond the 13
quarters included in the dataset to extend the evaluation to longer horizons. Fourth, the
framework of individual assignment by a caseworker could be extended to allow individu-
als to incorporate private information into their decisions; the policymaker then would not
simply offer individuals a choice but would design incentive-compatible assignment
mechanisms (see Dehejia, 1999a). These are subjects of ongoing research.
Appendix A
A.1 The Tobit Model
The likelihood for the Tobit model given equations (2) and (3) is:
[ ] [ ]2112 12/ )(exp)2()/(1),( 211 bspsbsb s XyxL nnCi i --F-= --ÎÕ ,
where C={j, t | yjt=0}, the elements of C are indexed by j, F is the standard normal c.d.f.,
and y1 denotes the vector of non-zero observations and X1 the corresponding covariates.
See Chib (1992) for further details.
A.2 The Estimation Procedure
The posterior distribution of the parameters of the Tobit model is obtained through a Gibbs
sampling procedure. The Gibbs sampler is a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation tech-
nique that simulates the joint posterior of the parameters of the model.  Instead of drawing
directly from the joint posterior (often intractable), it draws successively from the poste-
rior of each parameter (or block of parameters) conditional on all of the other parameters.
For any set of starting values (given certain conditions), these draws will eventually con-
verge to draws from the true posterior (see Chib and Greenberg, 1996; Gelman, Carlin,
Stern, and Rubin, 1996; Geman and Geman, 1984; Gelfland and Smith, 1990; Geweke,
1997; and Tanner and Wong, 1987).
In many cases, such as the Tobit, the task of drawing from the joint posterior is
simplified by augmenting the parameter space of the model. For the Tobit model, the pa-
rameter space is expanded to include the latent variables yit*; conditional on this variable,
the Tobit model reduces to a standard regression model, and, conditional on all other pa-
rameters, it is easy to draw from the posterior distribution of yit*.
The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the Tobit model has been worked out by Chib
(1992) (see also Albert and Chib, 1993). The Gibbs sampling scheme is:
(1) Let zity  equal yit for the uncensored observations, i.e., {i,t | yit > 0}, and for the
censored observations, i.e., {i,t | yit = 0}, draw for zity  from the negative portion of a trun-
cated normal distribution with mean bitx  and variance s
2.
(2) Draw for b from ( )12 )'(,ˆ -xxN sb , where zyxxx ')'(ˆ 1-=b  and
)',,,,,,,,( 13,13602,13601,136013,12,11,1
zzzzzzz yyyyyyy LLL=  and )',....,( 13,13601,1 xxx = ,







From an arbitrary starting value, this is iterated 5,000 times.  The first 4000 itera-
tions are discarded, leaving 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the parame-
ters.22
                                                
22 Several diagnostics suggest that throwing out the first 4000 runs is sufficient to converge to draws
from the posterior.  These include considering a wide variety of starting points, running the sampler for
more iterations, and comparing the mean of the posterior of the parameters with maximum likelihood
estimates of the same parameters.
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A.3 Simulating the Predictive Distribution
For each individual i in the group of interest, we consider xit,1 and xit,0. The specification of
xit,1 (xit,0) is identical to xit above, except that we impose Ti=1 (0). We use our stored

















ity ~N(xit,0 ß(j), s
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ity  according to equation (2).
In Section 4.1, we compare the distributions { }10001)(1 =jjity and { }10001)(0 =jjity  for i=822, 1043.
In Sections 4.4 and 5, we produce predictive draws of earnings under treatment and control
for the1360 individuals in the sample. For each individual, we compute a range of assign-
ment rules over the predictive treatment and control distributions. For example, in Table 8
(row 3), for each individual, we compute the probability of employment under treatment




, for t=1,0. The
policy “maximize probability of employment” will assign individual i to treatment (Ai = 1)
if pi1 > pi0. Then along row 3 we compute the mean of the specified outcomes based on this
assignment, for each draw from the predictive distribution. For example, for mean earn-
ings: ( ) ,1360/)1( )(0)(1å -+ jitijiti yAyA  for j=1,…,1000.
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CHILD4 Number of children less than age 4
CHILD45 Number of children between ages 4 and 5
CHILD611 Number of children between ages 6 and 11
CHILD18 Number of children between ages 12 and 18
CHILD19 Number of children aged 19 and greater
CAREAD Score on reading test
CAMATH Score on mathematics test
GRADE Educational attainment (grade 0 to 20)
HRWAGE Most recently recorded hourly wage
FAM.TYPE Indicator for households with single head
AGE Age
EXPER Indicator for a treat, experimental unit
CONTROL Indicator for control unit
SEX FEMALE Indicator for female participants
REFUGEE Indicator of refugee status
CUR.AFDC Indicator for receiving AFDC in pre-assignment time
PREVTR Indicator for previous training or job search activities
ETH. WHITE Ethnicity Indicator, White
ETH. HISP. Ethnicity Indicator, Hispanic
PEARNx Earnings in quarter x of pre-experimental time
PEARNxZ Indicator of zero earnings, pre-experimental quarter x
EARNx Earnings in quarter x of post-experimental time
EARNxZ Indicator of zero earnings, post-experimental quarter x
PAFDCx AFDC receipts, pre-experimental quarter x
AFDCx AFDC receipts, post-experimental quarter x
PFDSTMPx Food Stamps receipts, pre-experimental quarter x
FDSTMPx Food Stamps receipts, post-experimental quarter x
EMPPQx Employment status, pre-experimental quarter x
EMPQx Employment status, post-experimental quarter x
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Table 2:  Treatment Effect on Probability of Employment
Post-experimental
period














Notes:  A probit is used; covariates include variables for the number of children (CHILD4-
CHILD19), reading and writing test scores, grade, age, sex, ethnicity, and earnings histo-
ries (PEARN10-PEARN1). The treatment effect is computed as the discrete difference
between the probability of unemployment with the treatment indicator set to 0 and 1, where
the value of other covariates is set to their sample mean.  The delta method is used to com-
pute standard errors.
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Notes: All earnings are in 1988 dollars.
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Table 4: Characteristics of Three Typical Individuals
Variable Ms. 1043 Ms.  822 Ms. 397
CHILD4 0 0 0
CHILD45 0 0 0
CHILD611 1 0 0
CHILD18 0 1 3
CHILD19 0 0 1
CAREAD 253 218 227
CAMATH 228 212 222
GRADE 12 12 9
AGE 23 41 16
SEX FEMALE 1 1 0
REFUGEE 0 0 0
PREVTR 0 0 0
ETH. WHITE 0 1 0
ETH. HISP. 0 0 0
PEARN10 5687 11598 0
PEARN9 2992 11124 0
PEARN8 5397 15729 0
PEARN7 4391 29852 0
PEARN6 6232 0 0
PEARN5 3186 11660 0
PEARN4 4171 11660 0
PEARN3 4577 15000 0
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1 0.81 3327 2827 0.68 2329 2474
2 0.85 3773 2893 0.7 2496 2512
3 0.87 3942 2927 0.73 2689 2618
4 0.9 4185 2897 0.72 2524 2637
5 0.9 4341 3037 0.71 2438 2519
6 0.9 4219 2931 0.74 2665 2617
7 0.89 4386 3096 0.75 2800 2698
8 0.9 4499 3035 0.77 2852 2639
9 0.92 4819 3121 0.74 2623 2587
10 0.91 4747 3142 0.74 2755 2685
11 0.91 4717 3125 0.77 2896 2640
12 0.92 4765 3136 0.75 2794 2638
13 0.93 4823 2973 0.79 2969 2670
Notes: All earnings are in 1988 dollars.
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1 0 12406 3355 0 16739 4487
2 0 12818 3546 0 16804 4432
3 0 13236 3346 0 16907 4413
4 0 13652 3361 0 17065 4355
5 0 13683 3412 0 16865 4420
6 0 13582 3440 0 16924 4448
7 0 13695 3365 0 17230 4300
8 0 13678 3376 0 17074 4302
9 0 14259 3354 0 17071 4349
10 0 14186 3460 0 17145 4238
11 0 14271 3413 0 17369 4413
12 0 14265 3356 0 17388 4337
13 0 14465 3295 0 17133 4398
Notes: All earnings are in 1988 dollars.
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Table 5c: Predicted Earnings, With and Without Uncertainty, Ms. Three Ninety-Seven
Ignoring parameter uncertainty Accounting for parameter uncertainty



















1 129 539 191 690 107 554 208 739
2 217 802 218 716 137 568 231 795
3 190 659 208 683 163 634 234 791
4 209 736 202 689 257 841 222 741
5 198 709 257 778 210 751 223 750
6 215 745 193 711 261 836 191 652
7 239 820 289 843 267 892 260 823
8 224 713 271 823 276 866 256 802
9 340 966 298 915 302 944 242 776
10 323 948 333 998 336 955 255 777
11 324 923 311 905 309 920 295 867
12 352 962 301 863 354 999 327 970
13 293 864 266 860 368 1010 249 837
Probability of
employment
0.8575 0.8491 0.8494 0.8532
Average earn-
ings
250 257 257 245
Expected utility
(CRRA, q=3)
0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
Notes: All earnings are in 1988 dollars.
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Table 6: Groups Benefiting the Most and Least from GAIN






Number 766 594 249 1111
Avg. Earnings
GAIN
567 250 912 320
Avg. Earnings
AFDC
323 363 380 331
CHILD4 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.18
CHILD45 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.24
CHILD611 0.85 0.93 0.83 0.9
CHILD18 0.77 0.89 0.73 0.84
CHILD19 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.28
CAREAD 214 196 214 204
CAMATH 199 183 199 191
GRADE 11.98 9.25 12.43 10.42
AGE 33.52 37.76 33.16 35.87
SEX FEMALE 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.85
REFUGEE 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.09
PREVTR 0.40 0.04 0.8 0.12
ETH. WHITE 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.19
ETH. HISP. 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08
PEARN10 181 146 293 137
PEARN9 132 182 186 147
PEARN8 177 127 295 124
PEARN7 195 180 324 158
PEARN6 182 126 362 112
PEARN5 218 111 507 96
PEARN4 226 136 422 133
PEARN3 135 174 270 125
Notes: All earnings are in 1988 dollars.
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GAIN 463 0.2042 183
AFDC 372 0.1843 372





Notes: (a) Means are computed from the empirical distribution.
(b) Costs are normalized to zero for AFDC, and are an additional $3638 for
13 quarters of GAIN.
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Notes: Each set of values of the parameters from the posterior distribution defines a state of the world.
For each state of the world the social welfare functions are computed.  Thus, there is a distribution of
these SWFs over the various states of the world.  These are summarized by the mean and the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of the distributions.
* The estimated costs of the GAIN treatment are $3,638 for 13 quarters.
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Table 9:  Considering Ex Post Inequality, Quantiles of the Earning Distribution

































































































Note:  Each cell presents the median of the posterior distribution of the percentile, and in parentheses the
5th and 95th posterior percentiles.
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GAIN 428.3 317.6 65.3 2.1
AFDC 340.1 294.7 271.5 70.9
Mandated 477.7 394.3 332.2 156.2
Choice (1) 477.8 394.4 332.4 156.2
Risk Averse, log
GAIN 416.8 307.8 64.5 2.1
AFDC 337.1 291.7 268.7 70.2
Mandated 467.9 386.0 326.1 154.5
Choice (2) 468.0 386.1 326.2 154.5
Risk Averse, CRRA q=3
GAIN 390.7 285.7 75.2 3.0
AFDC 330.4 285.2 262.8 74.1
Mandated 445.6 366.8 311.8 153.0
Choice (3) 445.5 366.6 311.4 153.0
Notes: Expected utilities are normalized.
*   SWF=( )( )11 1- -åe e( )( )u ii , e=3, applied to the certainty equivalent of the individual
income distribution.
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Table A.1: Mean and Standard Deviation of the Posterior Distribution of the Tobit Pa-
rameters










































































































































Note: The mean of the posterior of s is 3259 (with a standard deviation of 44).
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Figure 1: Comparing Individuals with Reading Score>200 to those with Reading
Score<200: Treatment Effect (+,– 2 standard errors)










































Figure 2: Comparing Individuals with Previous Training Experience to Those without
Previous Experience: Treatment Effect (+/– two standard errors)




































Figure 3: Probability Densities: Empirical vs. Predictive, Treated Group













Figure 4: Probability Densities: Empirical vs. Predictive, Control Control








































































































































































































Figure 7: Predictive Distributions for Average Earnings


















Figure 8: Predictive Distributions for Increased Earnings Net-of-Costs






















Figure 9: Difference in Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution GAIN–AFDC
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